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Abstract
The paper investigates the optimal scope of trade secrets law. In the model,
one innovative rm invests resources rst to produce knowledge, and then to
protect it from unwanted disclosure. A rival rm invests to ferret out this
knowledge. Trade secrets law a¤ects this "secrecy contest" by reducing the
probability of unwanted disclosure given the e¤orts of the parties. We show
how optimal trade secrets policy depends on structural market features and
cost parameters. In the nal section, we consider the limit case in which the
innovation lies on the face of the product, and derive the optimal scope of
legal provisions preventing copycat imitation of products (unfair competition,
passing o¤).
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1 Introduction
In modern economies, the competitive advantage that rms enjoy on the market
depends increasingly on their specic expertise and knowledge, rather than on man-
ufacturing costs di¤erentials. To protect this knowledge, rms can rely on di¤erent
legal tools, including patents (for non-obvious inventions) and copyright (for novel
pieces of creative work). Yet, most companies tend to rely on the oldest, and most
likely the cheapest, form of protection: secrecy.1
The desire of companies to keep their competitive knowledge secret is not dis-
couraged by the law. To the contrary, the law supports the secret conservation of
knowledge, by sanctioning conducts aimed at the violation of condential business
information, such as unauthorized disclosure and espionage. In this respect, however,
the law is called upon to strike a di¢cult balance between the right of the knowl-
edge holder to preserve secrecy and the need of society to promote the dissemination
of valuable information. In fact, the di¤usion of innovative knowledge encourages
imitation and fosters competition in the market. Excessive secrecy protection, by
retarding the dissemination of the information in the economy, might not serve the
interests of consumers well.2
In this paper, we investigate the optimal scope of trade secrets (TS) law and
highlight the basic trade-o¤s that policy it called upon to address. In particular, we
develop a simple model in which a rm can create innovative knowledge that provides
a head-start advantage in the market. Once the knowledge is created, a rival rm
invests resources to ferret out this knowledge, whereas the innovator invests resources
to protect it. TS law a¤ects this secrecy contest by reducing the probability of
knowledge leakage, given the e¤orts of the parties. So, TS law a¤ects the investments
of the parties in the secrecy contest and the nal market structure.
Before illustrating the model, it is important to clarify the multifaceted nature
of TS law. As opposed to patent law, which shares the same basic features in most
jurisdictions, TS law varies substantially across countries. In most jurisdictions, pro-
visions regulating the protection of condential know-how are scattered in several
1Recent empirical work by Hall et al. (2013) shows that in the UK only 4% of innovating
companies patent. In the US, approximately 5.5% of all manufacturing rms engage in patenting
activity (Balasubramanian and Sivadasan 2011). Arundel (2001) nds that European manufacturers
investing in R&D rate secrecy as more important than patents for the protection of their innovations.
2As aptly remarked by the US Supreme Court in In Bonito Boats v. Thunder Craft Boats -
489 U.S. 141 (1989) : "[...] imitation and renement through imitation are both necessary to
invention itself, and the very lifeblood of a competitive economy." In this case, the US Supreme
Court invalidated a Florida statute prohibiting plug moulding of vessel designs.
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bodies of the law, including tort law, contract law, employment law, criminal law,
and - occasionally - intellectual property (IP) law. The country that has made the
greatest e¤ort to provide a unied framework for TS protection is most likely the
US, where the Uniform Trade Secrets Act (UTSA) of 1979, amended 1985, has been
adopted by most states.
Provisions close to those of the UTSA have been included in the international
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs) agreement of 1994,
which requires WTO member countries to provide legal protection to undisclosed in-
formation (art. 39, see below). In spite of the TRIPs agreement, signicant variations
with respect to substantial TS law persist across the world and across EU countries
(Backer-McKenzie 2013, Lippoldt and Schultz 2014).3 This has prompted an ini-
tiative of the European Commission aimed at imposing uniform legislation across
the Union (Proposal 2013/0402). The proposed directive provides for a common
denition of protectable knowledge and stipulates the remedies available in case of
misappropriation.4
To frame our analysis, we will follow the denition of TS provided by the TRIPs
agreement, which stipulates that (Art 39.2):
Natural and legal persons shall have the possibility of preventing information lawfully
within their control from being disclosed to, acquired by, or used by others without their
consent in a manner contrary to honest commercial practices so long as such information:
(a) is secret [...]; (b) has commercial value because it is secret; and (c) has been subject to
reasonable steps under the circumstances, by the person lawfully in control of the informa-
tion, to keep it secret.
From this denition, we learn that publicly available information and everyday
knowledge are not eligible for legal protection; valueless information and information
not subject to reasonable protection do not qualify as trade secrets.
Remedies for misappropriation usually include injunctive relief and damage awards.
Compared with patents and other types of intellectual property, trade secrecy is
characterized by several distinguishing features.
First, it does not require any form of registration. This does not mean, however,
that it can be protected at no cost. In fact, TS protection can be extremely expensive,
3Undisclosed business information is protected under the common law of condentiality in Eng-
land, whereas it is protected under unfair competition law (Unlauterer Wettbewerb) in Germany. In
France, the protection of manufacturing secrets is regulated by the Code of Intellectual Property.
See Backer-McKenzie (2013).
4A plan to strengthen TS protection in the US has been put forward by the Obama administration
at about the same time (see Executive O¢ce, 2013).
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depending on the type of information concerned. Expenses usually relate to the
installation of safety devices, the organisational e¤orts to avoid the leakage of the
information, and the costs related to the imposition of condentiality restrictions in
contractual relationships.
Second, the subject matter is extremely broad, as it encompasses any type of
undisclosed information able to provide a competitive advantage to its owner.5
Finally, the law does not provide an "exclusive right" to the holder of the secret.
Rather, the law draws the line between the sets of the lawful and unlawful ways in
which information can be obtained and used. For civil remedies to be applicable,
the secret must have been acquired in a manner contrary to honest commercial
practices, which means, under the TRIPs agreement: "at least practices such as
breach of contract, breach of condence and inducement to breach, and includes the
acquisition of undisclosed information by third parties who knew, or were grossly
negligent in failing to know, that such practices were involved in the acquisition."
(art. 39, footnote 10). Under the UTSA, improper means of acquisition of a secret
include: "theft, bribery, misrepresentation, breach or inducement of a breach of a duty
to maintain secrecy, or espionage through electronic or other means." Conversely,
independent creation, discovery through reverse engineering, and acquisition from
public sources represent traditional forms of legitimate appropriation of the secret.6
By drawing the line between the lawful and unlawful ways in which information can
be acquired, the law denes the scope of TS law.
The following examples illustrate the point. Let us consider the case of an em-
ployee who leaves her company to work for a competitor. Should the employee be
allowed to take with her the knowledge acquired in her rst job? In general, for-
mer employees are not allowed to disclose this knowledge (e.g., customers data) if it
qualies as a trade secret, whereas they are allowed to do so, if it is part of their "gen-
eral skill and knowledge." In drawing the line between "trade secrets" and "general
skill and knowledge," law makers must balance the opposing goals of encouraging
investment in knowledge and protecting job mobility, which is at the base of free
competition.7
5The US Economic Espionage Act, which criminalises TS misapproprition, denes the latter as:
"all forms and types of nancial, business, scientic, technical, economic, or engineering information,
including patterns, plans, compilations, program devices, formulas, designs, prototypes, methods,
techniques, processes, procedures, programs, or codes, whether tangible or intangible, and whether
or how stored, compiled, or memorialized physically, electronically, graphically, photographically, or
in writing" (§1839).
6See Backer-McKenzie (2013). This feature is explicitly acknowledged by the Directive proposal
of the European Commission (Proposal 2013/0402).
7In some jurisdictions, courts just assume - under the doctrine of "inevitable disclosure" - that
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Similar considerations arise with respect to the covenants not to compete after the
termination of the employment relationship. Californian courts tend not to enforce
them at all, whereas other courts take a more cautious stance (usually based on
"reasonableness" criteria). Clearly, where non-competition covenants are enforced,
the primary producer of the know-how is protected (she must spend less to retain her
employees, and she can share information internally more easily), but di¤usion of the
knowledge is stymied.8
Although outright theft of documents is obviously unlawful, other forms of in-
formation acquisition may or may not be lawful depending on circumstances and
jurisdictions. In the famous du Pont vs. Christopher case, a company hired a pilot
to take aerial pictures of a newly built plant, with the purpose of uncovering infor-
mation about the rivals manufacturing process.9 The court held that this conduct
was an improper method for the acquisition of information of the rivals production
technique. While recognising that "for our industrial competition to remain healthy
there must be breathing room for observing a competing industrialist," it concluded:
"Our tolerance of the espionage game must cease when the protections required to
prevent anothers spying cost so much that the spirit of inventiveness is dampened.
[...] To require DuPont to put a roof over the unnished plant to guard its secret
would impose an enormous expense to prevent nothing more than a school boys
trick." In the Christopher decision, the main arguments for the prohibition of the
conduct relied on the cost of self-protection and the adverse impact of the conduct on
inventiveness.10 These elements are formalised in the model below, which investigates
the impact of costs and market structure on the optimal policy.
In this paper, we focus on the case in which the secret information provides a
competitive advantage to its owner, who has no interest in sharing it. Once the
this transfer of proprietary knowledge cannot be avoided under the new duties taken up by the
employee. See, for example, PepsiCo, Inc. v. Redmond, 54 F. 3d 1262, 126364 (7th Circuit 1995).
Along the same line, mobility of groups of employees is subject to specic restraints. In some
jurisdictions, soliciting the departure of employee teams or departments from rival rms (so called
"poaching" or "raiding") is explicitly forbidden. In others, e.g., in California, it is not. Californias
high-tech companies have reacted by agreeing not to solicit each others employees. This practice,
however, has been considered anticompetitive by the antitrust authority. Complaint, US v. Adobe
Systems Inc., et al., DOJ, 2010.
8Californias exceptional labour mobility has been pointed out as a major driving force behind
the success of the Silicon Valleys district (see Saxenian 1994). Gilson (1999) underscores the role
served by Californias lax trade secrets law with respect to labour mobility.
9E.I du Pont deNemours & Co. v. Christopher, 431 F.2d 1012 (5th Cir. 1970).
10To put a roof over a plant to protect the secrets is an unreasonable request, not to put documents
in the trash is considered a reasonable measure to keep them secret. In most countries, dumpster
diving (searching in the trash for informative documents) is a lawful activity.
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information/know-how is obtained by the innovator, a rival rm invests resources to
ferret it out. At the same time, the innovator invests to protect it. This secrecy con-
test determines the probability by which knowledge spills from one rm to the other,
and hence the probability that the market shifts from monopoly to duopoly. TS law
complements the e¤ort of the innovator to keep the information secret. By reducing
the probability of information leakage, TS law decreases the (wasteful) expenditure of
the rms in the secrecy contest and harms competition. On this account, strong TS
law might not be desirable. In a dynamic perspective, one should also consider that
the "rent" granted by strong TS law to the secrecy holder provides incentives to the
creation of knowledge, to the benet of nal consumers. In this respect, the optimal
scope of TS law substantially depends upon how sensitive innovation production is
to changes in the payo¤ to the innovator.
In Section 2, we formally derive the three e¤ects mentioned above. An increase in
TS protection: i) encorages the creation of innovative knowledge ("innovation e¤ect"),
ii) reduces the private expenditure in the secrecy contest ("expenditure e¤ect"), and
iii) increases the probability that the market is monopolised by the innovator ("com-
petition e¤ect"). The optimal policy should balance benets and costs attendant
with these e¤ects.
Several factors a¤ect the optimal policy choice. First, if the creation of innovation
is very sensitive to changes in the payo¤ to the innovator (high elasticity of supply
of innovation), then maximal TS protection is optimal. If the elasticity of supply
of innovation is small - or nil - then the optimal policy will be guided by the other
two factors: expenditure e¤ect vs. competition e¤ect. We show that the expenditure
e¤ect is likely to dominate if the cost of self protection for the innovator is low and
cost of extraction for the rival is high. Under these conditions, the expenditure e¤ect
has a large weight in social welfare and maximal protection is preferable.
In general, when the cost of self-protection is high and cost of extraction is low,
the case for TS protection is weaker. In the limit case in which the extraction cost is
negligible, the optimal scope for legal protection is denitely narrower. This specica-
tion of our model captures those situations in which innovation lies on the face of the
product and only legal protection can prevent imitation (unfair competition/passing
o¤, see Section 3).
In the model, we take the intensity of competition upon duplication as given and
allow duopoly prices to range from perfect competition prices (Bertand competition)
to monopoly prices (collusion). This allows us to analyse the impact of competition
intensity on the optimal TS policy. We show that the relationship between com-
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petition intensity and optimal TS protection is non-monotonic: maximal protection
is optimal when competition is either very weak (collusion) or very intense (perfect
competition). In the rst case, the social gains from imitation are negligible: leakage
of the secret does not bring any benet to the consumers. So maximal TS protection
is optimal. When competition is very intense and duopoly prots are very low, the ri-
val has very weak incentives to extract the secret, while the innovator has very strong
incentives to protect it. In this case, the impact of TS policy on the secrecy expen-
diture is relatively large (legal protection substitutes for self -protection) while the
impact on market structure is small. Again, maximal protection is desirable. When
competition is neither too strong nor too weak, the consumers gain from imitation
outweighs the expenditure e¤ect and the optimal scope of TS law is narrower.
Finally, we consider the impact of horizontal product di¤erentiation. We show
that when the rival supplies a di¤erentiated product, TS protection should be re-
duced. Here, the benets to the consumers from duplication are so large and the
secrecy expenses so low, that the case for secrecy loses much of its weight. This
result is in line with the law of those jurisdictions (e.g., Germany and Austria), in
which an assessment of the degree of similarity of the products generally accompanies
misappropriation cases (de Vrey 2006).
The economic literature is limited on trade secret law and on unfair competition
in general. In their pioneering article, Posner, Landes and Friedman (1991) defend
trade secrets law on two grounds. On the one hand, trade secrets law complements
patent law by protecting those inventions that rms choose not to patent (either
because they fail to meet the patentability requirements or because patenting is too
expensive).11 On the other hand, TS law allows rms to reduce the investment in
self-protection (a feature captured by our model). Their analysis does not focus on
the role played by self-protection and extraction costs, and market structure on the
optimal policy.
Rønde (2001) investigates the e¤ect of TS law on the organisational structure of
rms. In his model, rms can divide production into independent tasks to limit know-
how leakage due to labour mobility. He shows, among other things, that the benets
of reducing the information sharing are greatest if the competition in the market is
neither very tough nor very weak. Fosfuri and Rønde (2004) analyse the impact of
TS law both on the extent of knowledge spillover (through labour mobility) and on
11Over the last decade, substantial research has been devoted to the patent /secrecy choice, both
from an empirical and theoretical perspective (see the review of Hall et al. (2014)). This literature,
however, is of tangential interest to us, as we focus on TS as a standalone branch of the law.
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the incentives of rms to cluster in the same area (to benet from the spillover, at
the cost of more intense product competition). In their model, the strength of TS
law is measured by the size of the damages awarded to the rst innovator, when a
worker moves to a rival rm to develop a follow-up innovation. Without a¤ecting the
size of the spillover, high damages reduce the wage earned by the worker and provide
rms with incentives to cluster together. Hence, they increase social welfare. The
e¤ect of strong TS law would not necessarily be positive, however, if TS law reduced
labour mobility (which is the case, for example, when injunctive relief is granted to
the innovating rm or when covenants not to compete are enforced by the courts).
In our model, we implicitly focus on the latter case by assuming that TS law a¤ects
the probability that knowledge spills from the innovator to a second (non-innovating)
rm.
2 The model
The models is built on the assumption that one rm, labelled "innovator," can invest
in the creation of innovative knowledge. This knowledge allows him to produce a new
product and obtain supercompetitive prots. A second rm (labeled "rival") has the
capacity to produce the same product, if it gains access to this knowledge. So a
secrecy contest takes place, in which the rival invests resources to extract information
from the innovator, while the innovator invests resources to protect it. The structure
of the secrecy contest is a¤ected by TS law: given the e¤orts of the two rms, the
probability that information leaks is smaller if the law o¤ers stronger protection.
When information leaks, the market turns into a symmetric duopoly.12
The probability that information leaks from the innovator to the rival is:
probability of leakage = (1  ) (xI ; xR) = (1  )
xR
xI + xR
;
where xI is the e¤ort exerted by the innovator and xR is the e¤ort exerted by the rival.
 2 [0; 1] captures the strength of TS law: stronger TS law makes leakage less likely,
given the e¤orts of the two parties. If TS law is very strong ( = 1), the probability
of leakage is nil. If TS is very weak ( = 0), the probability of leakage only depends
on the private e¤orts of the two parties

pr. leakage =  (xI ; xR) =
xR
xI+xR

:
The payo¤ to the innovator once she has obtained the secret knowledge is:
I (xI ; xR) = [1  (1  ) (xI ; xR)]m + (1  ) (xI ; xR) d   cxI : (1)
12The model can be suitably extended so as to allow for a plurality of duplicators. The qualitative
analysis remains una¤ected. Similarly, the analysis can be extended to allow for an innovation race
between rms.
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With probability [1  (1  ) (xI ; xR)] secret information is retained and the innova-
tor earns monopoly prots m. With probability (1  ) (xI ; xR) information leaks
to the rival and the innovator earns duopoly prots d: The cost of self-protection
amounts to cxI :
The payo¤ to the rival is
R (xI ; xR) = (1  ) (xI ; xR) d   sxR: (2)
With probability (1  ) (xI ; xR) the rival ferrets the secret information out and
enters the market, where he obtains duopoly prots d. The e¤ort to extract infor-
mation costs sxR:
In the secrecy contest, the two players will optimally choose xI and xR to maximize
their payo¤s. In the Nash equilibrium of this contest, the following conditions hold:
  (1  )0xI (xI ; xR) (m   d) = c
(1  )0xR (xI ; xR) d = s:
(3)
Stronger TS protection (large ) makes leakage less likely, and hence reduces both
the marginal benet of self-protection and the marginal benet of extraction.
Note that the marginal benets of e¤ort for the innovator and the rival are not the
same. When the rival enters the market, the loss for the entrant tends to be greater
than the gain for the rival: m   d > d (which is true as far as m > 2d; is a
condition that holds when products are not too di¤erent). The innovator, therefore,
tends to have stronger incentives to invest in the secrecy contest than the rival.13 In
line with the classic result of Gilbert and Newberry (1982), we call this observation
the Persistence of secrecy.
Let kI =
c
m d
be the relative self-protection cost for the innovator (cost as a
share of gain from protection), and kR =
s
d
the relative extraction cost for the rival
(cost as share of gain from extraction). From eqs. (3) ; we obtain the following
equilibrium values:
xI = (1  )
kR
(kR + kI)
2 ; x

R = (1  )
kI
(kR + kI)
2 ;
and
 (xI ; x

R) =
kI
kR + kI
=
c
c+ s

m
d
  1
  :
13Similarly, innovators will have greater incentives to lobby for favourable trade secrets legislation
than will imitators. Innovators can o¤er greater salaries to their key employees than imitators can.
The secrecy contest is symmetric if the two rms produce homogenous goods and collude on the
market:
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In equilibrium, the probability of information leakage (1  ) (xI ; x

R) depends on
the strength of trade secrets law  ; and on the relative costs in the secrecy contest.
Given  ; leakage is more likely if self-protection costs are higher (@

@c
> 0); extraction
costs are lower (@

@s
< 0); monopoly prots are lower ( @

@m
< 0); and duopoly prots
are higher (@

@d
> 0):
Note, for future reference, that total secrecy costs amount to
cxI + sx

R = kI (m   d) (1  )
kR
(kR + kI)
2 + kRd (1  )
kI
(kR + kI)
2
= (1  ) m
kIkR
(kR + kI)
2 = (1  ) m
 (1  ) : (4)
As in standard rent-seeking games, total secrecy costs are smaller if the two con-
testants are strongly asymmetric ( close to 1 or  close to 0).
A marginal increase in the strength of TS law reduces the amount of resources
wasted in the secrecy contest by an amount proportional to m
 (1  ) :14
Let us move now to the rst stage of the game, in which the innovator invests to
obtain the new piece of knowledge. From an ex-ante perspective, the expected prot
to the innovator is:
I = z I (x

I ; x

R)  d (z) ; (5)
where I (x

I ; x

R) is the expected prot that she obtains upon discovery (eq. 1), z the
probability of discovery and d (z) the discovery costs, with d0 > 0 and d00  0.
Thus, the optimal creation e¤ort z solves
I (x

I ; x

R) = d
0 (z) : (6)
By implicit di¤erentiation, we obtain @z

@
> 0: Stronger TS law increases the
innovation e¤ort.15
We can now turn to optimal policy. In this simple set-up, ex-ante social welfare
is
SW = z f[1  (1  )]Wm + (1  )
Wd   cx

I   sx

Rg   d (z
) ; (7)
where monopoly total surplus is Wm = m + Cm (prots + consumer surplus), and
duopoly total surplus is Wd = 2d + Cd (prots + consumer surplus). Trade secrets
14Note that the "rent seeking" specication of the secrecy contest implies that an increase in 
induces the same percentage reduction of xI and x

R:
15More precisely, @z

@
=
(m d)+
1
kR+kI
(1 )c
d00(z) :
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law a¤ects the self-protection and extraction e¤orts xI and x

R; the resulting proba-
bility of leakage (1  ), and, in turn, the probability that knowledge is created,
z:
We have
@SW
@
=
@z
@
f[(1  (1  ))Wm + (1  )
Wd   cx

I   sx

R]  d
0 (z)g
  z (Wd  Wm)  z

@
@
(cxI + sx

R) :
The rst term represents the welfare gain due to additional innovation e¤ort, the
second the welfare loss due to the increased likelihood of monopoly, and the last the
welfare gain due to reduced secrecy expenditure.
In view of eqs. (6), (1) ; and (4), we get
@SW
@
=
@z
@
f(1  (1  ))Cm + (1  )
 (Cd + d)  sx

Rg
 z (Wd  Wm) + z
m
 (1  ) ;
(8)
that is, in view of (2)
@SW
@
=
@z
@
f(1  (1  ))Cm + (1  )
Cd + R (x

I ; x

R)g
 z (Wd  Wm   m (1  
)) :
(9)
An increase in TS protection stimulates innovation, hinders di¤usion, and reduces
secrecy costs.16 The net e¤ect is captured by the following proposition.
Proposition 1 Stronger TS protection is socially desirable if, and only if, the fol-
lowing holds:
@z
@
1
z
f(1  (1  ))Cm + (1  )
Cd + R (x

I ; x

R)g| {z }
innovation e¤ect
+ (1  ) m| {z }
expenditure e¤ect
   (Wd  Wm)| {z }
competition e¤ect
> 0:
(10)
This formula has a simple explanation. The rst term captures the ex-ante e¤ect:
an increase in TS protection stimulates the creation of innovative knowledge. A small
increase in  induces a percentage increase in the probability of innovation equal to
16Social welfare is concave in  :
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@z
@
1
z
: In turn, this creates an innovation surplus equal to the "externality" that the
innovator exerts on the rival and the consumers. The gain accruing to the innovator
himself does not matter, because it is perfectly balanced, at the margin, by the
increase in innovation expenditure: This innovation surplus is higher if larger surplus
is netted by consumers on the market (Cm under monopoly, Cd under duopoly); and
if the rival obtains a larger payo¤ (expected prots less extraction expenditure).
The second term represents the gain due to the reduction in private expenditure
in the secrecy game. This gain tends to be small when the secrecy contest is very
asymmetric, i.e. when  is close to one or nil.
Finally, the competition e¤ect captures the loss due to the reduced probability
that the market shifts from monopoly to duopoly. This depends on the likelihood
of leakage in the absence of legal protection, ; and on the intensity of competition
upon duplication: This term collapses to nil if private protection alone is fully e¤ective
( ! 0); or if the rival and the innovator produce fungible goods and collude on
prices (market welfare under duopoly Wd = market welfare under monopoly Wm).
The innovation e¤ect is large if innovation is sensitive to policy changes. In turn,
this depends on shape of the innovation cost d (z) and the impact of the policy variable
 on the payo¤ to the innovator. If, for simplicity, we take an isoelastic cost function:
d (z) = 1

z; with  > 1; we get: z = I (xI ; xR)
1
 1 and
@z
@
1
z
=
1
  1
@I (xI ; xR)
@
1
I (xI ; xR)
:
The semielasticity of innovation is equal to the percentage increase in the innovators
expected prots (upon discovery) due to a small increase in TS protection, times
a factor 1
 1
which depends on the elasticity  of the cost function (in turn,  is
the inverse of the elasticity of the supply of innovation with respect to the research
expenditure). So, if the cost function is very elastic (or if the supply of innovation is
very inelastic), @z

@
1
z
goes to nil. As the supply of innovations becomes more elastic
(small ); the innovation e¤ect becomes larger:17
The surplus created by the innovation depends on  : If legal protection is weak, the
surplus is larger. This is intuitive, as a small  benets (ex-post) both the consumers
17Empirical estimates of the elasticity of the supply of innovation are reviewed by Denicolò (2007).
Note that @I(xI ;xR)
@
=  (m   d) +
1
kR+kI
(1  ) c; which is independent of both z and  .
Finally, note that @z

@
1
z
would be larger if innovation were the outcome of a race between rms.
In that case, stronger TS protection would increase the reward to the winner of the race and,
simultaneously, reduce the reward to the loser of the race. Both e¤ects boost the incentives to invest
in innovation.
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and the rival. Thus, as  increases, the share of the surplus appropriated by the
innovator increases, and the cause for legal protection decreases. The innovation
surplus is always positive, and it increases with .
Whether the optimal policy choice   lies on the interior or on the boundary
(  = 0;   = 1) depends on the relative weight of the three e¤ects. We know that
the optimal policy certainly involves maximal protection if the expenditure e¤ect
exceeds the competition e¤ect, i.e. if strong TS protection is optimal even from an
ex-post perspective. This case arises when the saving in self-protection/extraction
expenditure outweighs the reduction in market surplus brought about by an increase
in  : In this case, the justication for TS protection overlaps with the rationale
normally provided for rules against theft, which posit that, in the absence of such
rules, individuals would spend an excessive amount of resources in protection and
extraction activities [see, for instance, Posner (2007)].18
In our setting, "theft" concerns a special good - knowledge- which tends to be non
rival. So, the social gain due to the (involuntary) transfer of the asset is calculated
on the basis of the welfare associated with di¤erent market congurations (duopoly
vs. monopoly).
Below, we focus on those cases in which strong TS is optimal from an ex-post
perspective (and thus, a fortiori, from an ex-ante perspective). In general, this is more
likely to arise when competition in the duopoly market is weak (so that Wd  Wm is
small) and the innovator has the upper hand in the secrecy contest ( is small) (see
eq. 10). The latter case arises when the protection cost c is small and the extraction
cost s is large: knowledge can be e¤ectively protected and, even without TS law,
duopoly is unlikely to materialize.
From an ex-ante perspective (including the incentive e¤ect), the optimal policy
will be on the interior or on the boundary depending on the weight of the three e¤ects.
The incentive e¤ect brings the justication of TS law closer to that normally o¤ered
to intellectual property law. TS law di¤ers, in our model, because it directly impacts
the amount of resources parties invest in the secrecy contest.
Below, we provide more structure to market competition .
Case 1: Homogeneous goods.
Let us consider the case in which the goods produced by the two rms are perfect
substitutes. The inverse demand function is: p = 1   Q: Marginal production costs
18We are grateful to editor Scott Baker for this observation.
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are set to zero. Under monopoly, output is Qm =
1
2
; prots are m =
1
4
and consumer
surplus is Cm =
1
8
:
Under duopoly, the output level Qd depends on the intensity of competition be-
tween the rms (upon entry). In order to capture di¤erent outcomes, let: Qd = k;
with k 2

1
2
; 1

: For k = 1=2; we get the collusive outcome, for k = 2=3; Cournot
competition, and for k = 1; Bertrand competition. For us, Bertrand competition is
only a limit case: if the rival expects zero duopoly prots, he will not spend resources
to ferret the secret out. Duopoly prots are: d =
1
2
k (1  k) ; and consumer surplus
is: Cd =
1
2
k2:
Ex-post social welfare SW (once knowledge has been created) increases with  if,
and only if, the competition e¤ect is smaller than the expenditure e¤ect,  (Wd  Wm) <
 (1  ) m, i.e. if
(1  k)k +
k2
2
 
1
4
 
1
8
<
0
@1  c
c+ s

1=4
1=2 k(1 k)
  1

1
A 1
4
: (11)
This inequality is more likely to be met if the protection cost c is small and the
extraction cost s is large (so that  is small). If (11) is met, the (ex-post) optimal
policy entails maximal TS protection.
The relationship between the intensity of competition k and the optimal (ex-post)
policy is non-monotonic, as shown by Figure 1 below (which assumes that s = 1
4
c):
Minimal protection is warranted (ex-post) for intermediate levels of competition.
Maximal protection is warranted otherwise (note that ex post social welfare is linear
in ): Several factors are at work.
First, when competition is strong (k ! 1), information leakage provides great
benets to the consumers (Wd  Wm is large). However, since duopoly prots are
low, the rival has little to gain from the extraction of the secret, the extraction e¤ort
is low and the benets of leakage tend to materialize with small probability (small
). The competition e¤ect tends to be small. The small extraction e¤ort tends
to reduce also the secrecy expenditure. However, the latter e¤ect is countered by
the increase in the protection e¤ort of the innovator, who stands to lose more when
competition is strong. So, while both the competition and expenditure e¤ects will be
low, the latter will be relatively larger and inequality (11) will be met (1
2
  1
4
  1
8
< 1
4
):
When competition is very weak (k ! 1=2), information leakage provides a very
small gain to the consumes (Wd  Wm is small). The competition e¤ect will be very
small, while the expenditure e¤ect will not. Hence, maximal protection is desirable
(0 < s
c+s
):
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For intermediate levels of k, the competition e¤ect is sizable and minimal protec-
tion may be desirable. This occurs, however, only if the probability of disclosure in
the absence of legal protection () is su¢ciently large, i.e. only if the protection cost
c is large and the extraction cost s is small
Fig. 1. Intensity of competition and ex-post desirability of stronger TS protection.
In the special case of Cournot competition (k = 2
3
), minimal protection is optimal
ex-post if, and only if, s < 4
13
c.
If maximal protection is desirable ex-post, it will a fortiori be so ex-ante (taking
the innovation incentives into account). The weight of the innovation e¤ect depends
on the elasticity of the supply of innovation (1=).
In Figure 2, we x  = 2 and posit that s is su¢ciently small to make minimal
protection optimal ex post (s = 0:01; c = 1): Optimal TS protection depends on the
intensity of competition k as follows.
15
Fig. 2. Optimal TS scope given intensity of competition.
Optimal TS scope is maximal both for low levels and high levels of competition,
for the reasons explained above. Non-maximal TS protection is optimal only for
intermediate levels of k, in which the competition e¤ect is su¢ciently large.19
The next example generalises the insights obtained to the case of horizontally
di¤erentiated goods.
Case 2: Product di¤erentiation
Let us consider the case where the rival is able to supply a product that is di¤erent
from that supplied by the innovator, and neither product dominates the other one.
Let the inverse demand functions faced by the innovator and the rival be, respec-
tively,
p1 = 1  q1   (1  ) q2; and p2 = 1  q2   (1  ) q1;
where  2 [0; 1] is a parameter that captures the degree of product di¤erentiation.20
For  = 1; the two goods are perfectly di¤erentiated. In fact, they are independent
of each other. This implies that there is no competition between the innovator and
the rival: both producers are monopolists on their own market. For  = 0; the
19With quadratic innovation costs, optimal protection under Cournot competition (k = 2=3) is
maximal for all combinations of c and s. Non maximal protection can only be optimal if the supply
of innovation is relatively inelastic ( < 2):
20See Singh and Vives (1984). The case of complementary goods, which arises for  > 1; is of no
interest here. In fact, when goods are complements, the innovator is always better o¤ if the rival
enters the market. In this situation, stronger TS law (enforcement of non-disclosure agreements)
facilitates technological transfer and hastens entry.
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goods are perfects substitutes (homogeneous goods). Production costs are set to 0.
Consumer surplus is
CSd =
1
2
(1  (1  ) q2   p1) +
1
2
(1  (1  ) q1   p2) = (2  ) q
2
1;
while individual rms prots are
d = p1q1 = p2q2 = (1  (2 + ) q1) q1:
In the absence of imitation (q2 = 0), the innovator serves only the rst market
and pm =
1
2
; qm =
1
2
; CSm =
1
8
; and m =
1
4
:
We concentrate on some important cases.
Collusion: Firms maximise their joint prots: 1+ 2 = p1q1+ p2q2: The optimal
quantities are q1 = q2 =
1
2(2 )
; while the prices charged are p1 = p2 =
1
2
:
Cournot : Firms compete in quantities. By combining the best response functions,
we get q1 = q2 =
1
3 
= p1 = p2: Equilibrium quantities are now larger than under
collusion.
Bertrand. If rms compete in prices, we get: p1 = p2 =

1+
; and q1 = q2 =
1
(2 )(1+)
:
Firms prots are largest under Collusion and smallest under Bertrand. As goods
become more di¤erentiated, the three competition modes converge to the same out-
come (two independent monopolies). Note that, as goods become more di¤erentiated,
our assumption of no-technology-licensing becomes more demanding (aggregate prof-
its exceed monopoly prots), especially if competition is weak.21
Let us start again from the ex-post perspective. As in the homogenous goods
case, the weight of the expenditure e¤ect is larger if  is small, i.e. if the protection
cost c is small and the extraction cost s is large. Let us concentrate on the impact of
product di¤erentiation.
As products become more di¤erentiated, the gain from information extraction for
the rival increases while the loss from disclosure for the innovator decreases. This
implies that the rival spends more on extraction, while the innovator spends less in
protection. In the limit, for  ! 1; the two markets become completely independent,
leakage (in the absence of TS protection) tends to occur with the largest probability,
 ! 1; and the expenditure e¤ect collapses to nil. The competition e¤ect, on
21Suppose that the innovator licenses the innovation to the rival. If the intensity of competition
is not a¤ected by licensing (say, the licensing fee just allocates bargaining surplus according to a
xed sharing rule), then only the innovation e¤ect remains, of our welfare analysis. Maximal TS
protection is optimal because, by increasing the licensing fee, it enhances the incentives to innovate.
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the contrary, displays its maximal potential, as leakage provides great benets to
consumers. So, if goods are highly di¤erentiated, minimal protection is optimal .
Both the competition and expenditure e¤ects are largest under Bertrand and
smallest under collusion. In the latter case, the benets from duplication for the
consumers are the least and stronger TS protection tends to be desirable ex-post.
Figure 3 highlights the combinations of c=s and  that yield maximal or minimal TS
protection.
Fig. 3. Ex-post optimal TS scope given product di¤erentiation and secrecy costs.
Note that, while the ex-post desirability of TS protection is clearly highest under
Collusion, the ranking between Bertrand and Cournot depends on the level of product
di¤erentiation. For low levels of di¤erentiation, strong TS protection is more likely
to be desirable (ex-post) under price competition than under quantity competition.
The opposite applies when products are highly di¤erentiated.
Ex-ante perspective. Clearly, the ex-ante optimal legal protection   will be max-
imal if  = 1 is optimal ex-post (i.e. if products are weakly di¤erentiated, protection
costs are high and extraction costs are low).
Figure 4 plots the optimal scope of TS law as a function of product di¤erentiation
(given s = 0:01; c = 1).
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Fig. 4. Optimal TS scope given product di¤erentiation.
The optimal scope of TS law becomes narrower as goods become more di¤er-
entiated. Even if the innovation e¤ect becomes larger as goods become more dis-
similar (pushing for stronger TS protection), the competition e¤ect prevails. Thus,
as  increases,   (weakly) decreases. The optimal protection is higher under price
competition (Bertrand) than under quantity competition (Cournot), since under the
former the innovation surplus is larger. The optimal protection levels under Bertand
and Collusion cross: for large levels of , the small innovation surplus attendant with
Collusion calls for weaker TS protection.22
3 Unfair competition
To disentangle further the factors driving optimal TS policy, let us consider the limit
case in which innovative knowledge cannot be concealed: s! 0: This case arises, for
example, when the innovation lies on the face of the product. In the absence of legal
provisions, the innovation immediately spills to the rival (for simplicity, we stick to
the hypothesis that only one rm can imitate the product).
Provisions limiting outright imitation of products exist in many countries (un-
der the heading of unlauterer Wettbewerb, concurrence déloyale, ongeoorloofde med-
edlinging, competenzia desleal, concorrenza sleale).23 Admittedly, British courts tend
22Social welfare under Betrand is the highest and is the most sensitive to variations in  :
23Since 1925, protection agains unfair competition has been part of the Paris Convention for the
Protection of Industrial Property. Art. 10bis (2) stipulates "Any act of competition contrary to
honest practices in industrial or commercial matters constitutes an act of unfair competition." In
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to apply a rather narrow version of unfair competition, mostly based on the tort of
passing o¤ (see Henning-Bodewig 2006, de Vrey 2006, and Ohly 2011). Most civil
law countries have statues limiting copycat imitation of (well-established) products
(parasitic copying, slavish imitation). These statutes create "quasi property rights"
complementing traditional IP law.24
For s ! 0; we obtain: xI = 0; x

R = (1  )
m d
c
; and  = 1: Total secrecy
expenditure, cxI + sx

R; collapses to nil. The only obstacle to imitation is unfair
competition law.25 The product is imitated with probability 1   . We have:
lim
s!0
SW = z fWm + (1  )Wdg   d (z
) ;
and (see 9):
lims!0
@SW
@
=
@z
@
fCm + (1  )Cd + (1  ) dg   z
 (Wd  Wm) :
This expression highlights the standard innovation/di¤usion trade-o¤. Strong pro-
tection promotes inventiveness, but stymies competition.
Protection should be increased if, and only if,
@z
@
1
z
[Cm + (1  ) (Cd + d)]| {z }
innovation e¤ect
> Wd  Wm| {z }
competition e¤ect
Note that now, from an ex-post perspective, minimal protection is always optimal.
With an isoelastic innovation cost function (d (z) = 1

z), we obtain
@SW
@
=
1
  1
m   d
m + (1  ) d
fCm + (1  )Cd + (1  ) dg   (Wd  Wm) :
(12)
If innovation is highly inelastic (large ); the innovation e¤ect is negligible and   = 0:
If innovation is highly elastic (small ); the innovation e¤ect dominates and   = 1:
particular, examples of unfair competition include "acts that create confusion with the activities of
a competitor." This case is close to the common law tort of passing o¤.
24The British idiosyncrasy for these quasi-property rights has been vividly expressed by Justice
Jacob: There is no tort of copying. There is no tort of taking a mans market or customers. Neither
the market nor the customers are the plainti¤s to own. There is no tort of making use of anothers
goodwill as such. There is no tort of competition" (Hodgkinson & Corby v. Wards Mobility Services,
1995, FSR 169). A rather di¤erent view is taken by the Austrian Supreme Court: "Anyone who
without any achievement of his own, without creative e¤ort of any consequence, adopts wholesale
the unprotected achievement of another to compete with the injured party using the latters own
painstaking and expensive achievement acts dishonesly within the meaning of Sec. 1 of the Act
Against Unfair Competition." (15/09/2005, 38 IIC 749, cited by Henning-Bodewig 2013).
25Note that our result does not bear on the issue of whether protection should be provided by
means of IP law or unfair competition law.
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When the solution is on the interior, the optimal policy is given by
  =
1
 1
(Cd + d)  d
Wd Wm
m d
1
 1
(Cd   Cm) + (Wd  Wm)
:
The optimal policy for the case with homogenous goods and quadratic innovation
costs ( = 2) is shown in Figure 5. The optimal policy is contrasted with the optimal
policy of the previous section (trade secrecy). In the absence of a secrecy contest, 
a¤ects social welfare only through the innovation and competition e¤ects.
Fig. 5. Optimal protection against imitation vs. optimal TS protection (dashed).
The optimal scope of unfair competition law (passing o¤) is substantially nar-
rower. Again, the relationship between k (intensity of competition) and   (optimal
protection) is U-shaped.
The optimal policy entails   = 1 for k  2=3. With quadratic innovation costs,
copycat imitation is socially benecial only if competition is more intense than under
Cournot.
Under product di¤erentiation, a similar result arises. Optimal protection is nar-
rower if the secrecy contest is absent. Figure 6 shows the case of Cournot competition
(Bertrand and Collusion follow similar patterns).
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Fig. 6. Optimal scope of unfair competion law given product di¤erentiation.
Also in the simple unfair competition scenario, the optimal policy scope decreases
with the degree of product di¤erentiation: protection against imitation should be
stronger when the product of the rival is a copy-cat duplication of the product of the
innovator. This is remarkably in line with the legislation of most EU countries.
4 Conclusion
Our model sheds light on benets and costs of TS law. In particular, we show that TS
law: i) reduces the expenditure of the parties in the secrecy contest, ii) it encourages
the creation of knowledge by increasing the payo¤ to innovative rms, and iii) it
hinders the di¤usion of innovative knowledge in society and, thus, limits competition.
Our model shows that the proper balance between these e¤ects depends on a variety
of factors. In particular, we have shown that maximal TS scope is likely to be optimal
when competition in the product market in either very week or very intense, the cost
of self-protection is low, and the cost of information extraction is high. If the latter
two conditions do not hold (i.e. if information spills easily from the innovator to the
rival), TS law loses some if its bite: the competition e¤ect tends to outweigh the
expenditure e¤ect and weaker protection tends to be optimal.
At the limit, when the innovation lies on the face of the product, the law can still
provide some protection against imitation (prevention of "unfair competition"). The
optimal scope of this protection, however, is limited.
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When the product supplied by the rival is (horizontally) di¤erentiated, the optimal
scope for protection is again limited. Product di¤erentiation dilutes the incentives of
the parties to invest in the secrecy contest. It enhances the benets form imitation
for the consumers and increases the gains from information di¤usion.
The last result has interesting ramications in the context of current law. In
Germany, for example, cases in which the misappropriation of secrets leads to the
introduction of goods that imitate those of the secret-owner are decided by consider-
ing, inter alia, the degree of similarity between the products. The chances that the
aggrieved party succeeds in court are higher if the products are close to each other
(see de Vrey 2006). This feature is in line with the results of our model.
Our model does not address several features of TS law that deserve recognition.
First, we have not considered the case in which the owner of the know-how in-
tends to licence it to other rms. Here, by inhibiting third parties from using misap-
propriated knowledge,TS law complements contract law in facilitating technological
transfers.26
Second, we have not considered the case in which rms can protect innovative
knowledge by means of a plurality of legal tools. Stronger TS protection induces
companies to rely more on secrecy and less on formal IP rights, when these are
available. With respect to patents, this tends to generate a social cost. Patents
require the disclosure of the invention and have a nite duration. They provide
an exclusive right. Secrets can potentially last forever, and are not exclusive. In
general, patents tend to provide incentives to innovate at a lower social cost than
secrets, thanks to the winner-take-all e¤ect (Denicolò and Franzoni 2010). Thus, one
potential downside of strong TS protection is that it estranges rms from the patent
system.27
Finally, one additional cost of secrecy lies with the risk of knowledge loss. This
was a concrete possibility in the past, when the secrets (arcana) of the craft were
tightly kept by the master. The case of the Stradivarius violins is paradigmatic.
Stradivarius did not share the secrets of his workmanship. With his death, they were
lost forever.28
26Lemley (2011) argues that this is the leading function of TS law.
27Trade secrets and patents are compared, under di¤erent scenarios, also in Denicolò and Franzoni
(2012). See Hall et al. (2014) for a exhaustive review of the literature on the patent/trade secrecy
choice.
28This example was suggested to us by Hans-Bernd Schaefer. Similarly, the method developed
by mathematician Scipione del Ferro (1465-1526) to solve cubic equations is not yet known with
certainty. In the 16th century, mathematicians gained their reputation in public competitions where
they challenged each other. They generally would not reveal their solution methods (de Laat 2000).
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Appendix
Here we derive the optimal policy solution for the case in which innovation costs are
quadratic: d (z) = 12z
2:
1) Optimal TS scope in the homogenous goods case:
 =
 16c3(1  k)3k4( 5 + 15k   16k2 + 4k3)
 4c2(1  k)2k2( 1  26k + 134k2   296k3 + 336k4   192k5 + 32k6)s
 4ck(1  2k + 2k2)2( 3 + 20k2   33k3 + 16k4)s2 + (1  2k + 2k2)3(7  12k + 8k2)s3
 8c(1  k)k(1  2k + 2k2)(4c2(1  k)2k2(1  3k + k2)
+ck(7  37k + 80k2   90k3 + 48k4   8k5)s  (4k   3)(1  2k + 2k2)2s2)
;
where k represents the intensity of market competition.
2) Optimal TS scope under di¤erentiated goods, Bertrand competition:
 =
256c33( 4 + 92 + 23 + 54)
+s3(1 + )2( + 3   2)3(12  12 + 32   143 + 74)
 8cs2( + 3   2)2(20  4   192   163   244 + 36)
+16c2s2( 104 + 44 + 1622 + 293 + 1004   1415   306   617 + 9)
(16c( + 3   2)(16c22(3 + 3 + 2) + s2( + 3   2)2(2   + 33))
+2cs(20 + 12   112 + 43   184   76)
;
where  measures the degree of product di¤erentiation.
3) Optimal TS scope under di¤erentiated goods, Cournot competition:
 =
256c3( 25 + 56   212 + 23)
 s3(3  )2(5  6 + 2)3(23  34 + 72)
 8cs2(5  6 + 2)2(177  380 + 2002   403 + 34)
 16c2s(1885  6042 + 64232   27483 + 5234   425 + 6)
16c(5  6 + 2)(16c2( 5  2 + 2)
+s2(5  6 + 2)2(3  10 + 32)+
2cs( 85 + 12 + 1262   603 + 74))
:
4) Optimal TS scope under di¤erentiated goods, Collusion
 =
(c3(7   4)  cs2(1  )2(18  29 + 62)
+s3(1  )3(12  20 + 72) + c2s( 16 + 40   252 + 3))
2c(1  )( 7cs((1  ) + c2(1 + 2) + 2s2(1  ))2(3   2)))
:
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